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Abstract 
· · Worldwide, hunger continues to pose great problems for humanity. Despite 
popular belief, hunger is a problem of inequality, not agricultural production. The fast­
approaching global peak in oil production, the point at which half of all existing oil has 
been used, means that hunger, now a problem of inequality, will soon become a problem 
of production unless contemporary agricultural production is transformed. This project 
examines the promise of urban agriculture in providing food security following the 
collapse of petroagriculture . 
. The case of Cuba, albeit fostered by political economic conditions and not 
emerging geophysical limitations, provides a model of agricultural development for the 
rest of the world. The collapse of the Soviet trade bloc in 1989 undermined Cuba's 
agriculture sector, as former inputs (particularly petroleum) were no longer available. To 
feed its population, Cuba initiated the largest organic agriculture effort in history. In doing so, Cuba successfully thwarted potentially devastating hunger and possible famine. 
Degradation of the planet is inextricably linked to the degrading conditions of life 
for the majority of the world's population. A systematic examination of the Cuban case 
exemplifies the importance and feasibility of urban agriculture for simultaneously 
addressing the roots of both. 
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I. Iµtroduction 
The popular image of hunger is a person of color, wide-eyed, with bloated belly, 
surrounded by swarming flies. This image implies the innocence of such victims, whose 
misfortune is being born on a continent, usually Africa, Asia, or South America, where 
people are not educated enough to produce food for themselves, where population growth 
surpasses ecological limits, and where environmental disasters tax the available food 
supply. The dominant view is that hunger and food security are problems of agricultural 
production and overpopulation. 
This image of hunger as an unfortunate but inevitable aspect of contemporary life 
is misleading. As many analysts have demonstrated (Altieri, Rosset, & Thrupp 1998; 
Cook 2004; Davis 2001; Dawkins 2003; Lappe, Collins, & Rosset 1998; Magdoff 2004; 
Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel 2000; Manning 2004a; Poppendieck 1986), food security 
today is a problem of food access and distribution, not agricultural production or 
overpopulation. As a result of technologies implemented following the Second World 
War, contemporary agricultural processes produce enough food globally to meet the 
expanding demands of a growing world population. People go hungry because of 
inequality, not ecological limits to food production. 
And yet, the popular image of hunger as a problem of agricultural production 
appears to have been darkly prophetic. Assuming that problems of inequality are 
resolved, massive hunger in the future is likely because the contemporary mode of 
agricultural production will inevitably end due to its dependence on finite, non-renewable 
1 
petroleum1 resources (Goodstein 2004; Heinberg 2003; 2004; Roberts 2004; Shah 2004). 
Every stage of agricultural production - from farm to plate - uses vast quantities of oil. 
The fast-approaching global peak in oil production, that point at which exactly half of all 
existing oil has been used, means that hunger, now a problem of inequality, will become 
a problem of production unless contemporary agricultural production is transformed. 
The specific form of any transition to post-petroleum agricultural production is 
not a certainty, but depends on the social responses to peak oil. The certain end of 
petroagriculture (that is, contemporary agriculture dependent on oil) means that 
production patterns will necessarily change - with or without planning. But the abilities 
of individual nations to address the problem differ significantly. If insufficient action is 
taken, the inequalities in national capacities for adapting to the changing conditions will 
foster even greater levels of food insecurity and may lead to more widespread global 
conflict over the now-scarce resources. Adverse consequences of the sudden end of 
petroagriculture suggest the need to search for alternatives to petroagriculture prior to the 
global peak in oil production. 
Urban agriculture in Cuba arising within the last fifteen years provides insights 
into possible alternatives to contemporary agricultural production. Cuba experienced an 
abrupt end to their oil supply, essentially experiencing peak oil fostered by political and 
economic conditions rather than geophysical realities. To ensure food security, Cuba 
worked quickly to transform agricultural production. The collapse of the Soviet trade 
bloc in 1989 undermined Cuba's agriculture sector, as inputs necessary for agricultural 
1 Petroleum and oil are used interchangeably. 
2 
production, most notably petroleum, became less available. Cuba subsequently initiated 
the largest alternative agriculture effort in history and successfully thwarted famine. 
Using secondary data sources, I provide a descriptive account of urban agriculture 
in Cuba after the elimination of petroleum imports. My purpose in undertaking this 
examination is to illuminate'how Cuba accomplished this transformation in the-mode of 
agricultural production. I identify some of the conditions that sparked the shift in 
production techniques, describe the transition process, and analyze the potential of urban 
agriculture as an alternative to contemporary agricultural production that depends entirely 
on oil. The goal of this project is not to generalize the experiences of urban agriculture in 
Cuba, but to identify and analyze the case to understand how Cuba may provide lessons 
for urban agriculture elsewhere. 
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II. Problem Defined: Food Security in the 2rt Century 
I employ a literature review to elaborate and substantiate the description of my 
research problem. I first draw on the literature to examine food security and the role 
contemporary agricultural production plays in generating food security and/or insecurity. 
I then examine the techniques of agricultural production to illustrate agriculture's reliance 
on oil. After a brief discussion of peak oil production, I scrutinize the adverse 
consequences of an unplanned response to the inevitable transformation of agriculture. 
Finally, I identify some ways for avoiding those negative consequences. 
A Political Ecology of Famine: Food Security and the Social Foundation of Hunger 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2004a) estimates 
that 852 million people were undernourished in 2000-2002, but this statistic 
underestimates the problem: hunger is a much gre�ter problem when viewed within the 
framework of food insecurity, the overall lack of reliable access to adequate food. 
Expanding the concept of food security beyond those who are immediately 
undernourished drastically increases the number of people threatened by food security. 
Fred Magdoff (2004) states that as many as 3 billion people are actually living under food 
insecurity globally. 
Several theoretical perspectives explain hunger. Central to the differing 
theoretical perspectives are views on the relative weights of two factors in creating 
hunger: food production and population growth. 
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Radical Ecological 
Malthusian 
Figure 1. Theoretical Perspectives on Hunger 
(Source: Humphrey, Lewis, & Buttel 2002) 
Craig Humphrey, Tammy Lewis, and Frederick Buttel (2002) analyze the nature 
of theoretical perspectives on hunger through a typology reflecting different positions on 
those two factors - population and production (see Figure 1). Neo-Malthusian2 
perspectives view hunger as a problem of population pressures, while adherents to non­
Malthusian views argue that population pressures are not causal factors of food 
insecurity. Productionist viewpoints situate production increases as necessary to the 
reduction of hunger �nd nonproductionists argue that social factors such as inequality in 
. food access and distribution are instrumental in creating food insecurity (Humphrey, 
Lewis, & Buttel 2002). 
2 Thomas Malthus theorized in the early 19th century that population growth and ecological limits 
in combination produced hunger; Malthusian theory blames environmental degradation on the 
working class and provides a ready cover for capitalist exploitation. 
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There are four general typologies regarding hunger. Conservative non­
Malthusians argue that free-market expansion will increase agricultural production and 
reduce hunger; productionist neo-Malthusians view population control coupled with 
production increases as the solution to hunger; radical non-Malthusian political 
economists understand the problem of hunger as rooted in social systems and do not view 
population pressures and agricultural production levels as causal factors of food 
insecurity; finally, ecological Malthusians link population growth with ecological 
degradation generally as the cause of food insecurity (Humphrey, Lewis, & Buttel 2002). 
Historical records support the radical view of hunger. Evidence suggests that 
hunters arid gathers were not hungry. This finding counters the traditional account that 
depicts hunger as the motivation for hunters and gatherers to invent horticulture and 
sedentary agriculture, or the cultivation of crops and livestock by humans for 
consumption. Indeed, research reveals a persistence of famine in agricultural societies 
and provides evidence that hunger originated with the advent of sedentary agriculture. 
The construction of social status, facilitated by food storage, created the problem of food 
scarcity for segments of the population (Davis 2001; Diamond 1999; Manning 2004a). 
As such, food insecurity is actually a product of agriculture. Sedentary agriculture 
created notions of social status based on the storage of foodstuffs; food could be hoarded 
by some individuals and denied to others. Prior to storage, there was no reason to store 
( or hoard) food. Food items (plants and animals) would simply rot, hence community 
sharing and collective attainment of food was commonplace (Manning 2004a). 
The historical record, then, indicates that hunger and famine are not results of 
food supply shortages. Through historical research on hunger and famine in Asia and 
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Africa throughout the late 19th and early 20th century, Mike Davis (2001) notes, 
"Although crop failures and water shortages were of epic proportion - often the worst in 
centuries - there were almost always grain surpluses elsewhere . . .  that could have 
potentially rescued drought victims. Absolute scarcity . . .  was never the issue" (p. 11  ). 
Indeed, we know that hunger today is not a problem of production, because ample 
supplies of food exist (Altieri, Rosset, & Thrupp 1998; Cook 2004; Davis 2001; Dawkins 
2003; Lappe, Collins, & Rossel 1998; Magdoff 2004; Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel 2000; 
Manning 2004a; Poppendieck 1986). 
To grasp adequately the fundamental causes of hunger, I adopt a radical 
perspective, or the 'political ecology of famine' from Davis (2001 ), which incorporates 
"the viewpoint both of environmental history and Marxist political economy" (p. 15). A 
political ecology of famine, Davis (2001) explains, situates any ecological limits of food 
production not through deterministic natural relations, but "by 'negotiated settlement' 
since each society has institutional, social, and technical means for coping with risk . . .  
Famines [thus] are social crises that represent the failures of particular economic and 
political systems" (p. 288). Hunger is not a result of population growth or a problem of 
production (as many argue), but is a problem first and foremost of social institutions -
particularly, the institution of capitalist agriculture. 
Hunger is the logical result of capitalist agriculture, because it is not directed to 
serve human needs. In capitalist society, agriculture does not produce food; rather, it 
produces commodities, or goods for the market. "As we have seen, industrial agriculture 
grows commodities, not food. The fact that commodities do not meet our bodies' needs 
is irrelevant" (Manning 2004a: 163). More precisely, capitalist agriculture produces food 
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(a use-value in political economic terms), for the purposes of producing a commodity that 
yields a market price, covering the cost of production plus a profit (exchange-value). As 
a commodity, the products of agriculture must be kept in high demand to be profitable; 
food must be scarce if it is to be used as a tool for capital accumulation. Controlled 
scarcity of anything, including food, increases prices and profits. So hunger is as 
necessary to capital accumulation as is unemployment. Magdoff (2004) explains, "Under 
capitalism, food is just another commodity - like a pair of shoes, a television, or an 
automobile. People have no more legal right to food than they have to any other 
commodity" (p. 4). With agriculture a captive of capitalism, profit maximization is more 
important than food security. 
Growth, as the driving logic of capitalism, destroys food security when applied to 
agriculture. Surplus and overaccumulation are outcomes of, and possible threats to, 
capitalism. In respect to agriculture, the inherent tendency of capitalism to expand 
creates an oversupply of food, but as commodities this oversupply hurts prices. Extra­
economic means, such as advertising and branding, are then used to make agriculture 
profitable. Periodic overproduction of foodstuff commodities leads to price crashes that 
wipe out less competitive ( or less politically protected) small producers (Cook 2004; 
Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel 2000). 
Market competition punctuated by overproduction crises drive the concentration 
and centralization of agricultural capital into the hands of a few large agribusinesses that 
squeeze and/or eliminate less competitive ( or less politically protected) small producers. 
Under capitalism, small-scale producers of agricultural commodities face a downward 
pressure on prices and/or upward pressure on inputs (Cook 2004). This pressure in turn 
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forces the adoption of new technologies and continual increases in the scale of 
production, creating a never-ending cycle: production increases are necessary just to 
retain revenue levels. "The treadmill that this creates is indicated by an old New England 
saying: 'we grow more com, to feed more cows, to make more milk, to buy more land, to 
grow more com"' (Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel 2000:12). As with other forms of 
production under capitalism, agricultural production tends to concentrate and centralize 
within large business. This trend toward increasing economies of scale produces hunger 
as a predictable by-product of the displacement of small-scale subsistence farmers who 
lose self-sufficiency. 
The problematic nature of capitalist agriculture has long been recognized. As 
Karl Marx ( 1981 )  noted in Capital, volume 3: 
the capitalist system runs counter to a rational agriculture, or that a 
rational agriculture is incompatible with the capitalist system (even if the 
latter promotes technical development in agriculture) and needs either 
small farmers working for themselves or the control of the associated 
producers (p. 216). 
The problem of food insecurity has accelerated in recent decades as Northem3 
capitalism uses agriculture as a tool to incorporate all comers of the world into the global 
capitalist system. Agriculture became a global project through what is commonly 
referred to as 'development,' by the neoliberal world order (Biel 2000). 
Today,,development implies the capitalist model of economic growth. "[T]his 
notion is universalized in contemporary neoliberalism as the proven solution to the social 
and economic problems of all countries" (Peet 1999: 13). Neoliberal development is a 
3 The term 'global North' or 'North' is used to denote countries called "core," "developed," or 
"first world," in most of the existing literature; unless otherwise noted, the author's original 
language is preserved to denote said geographies. 
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one-size-fits-all approach that systematically undermines the socio-ecological stability of 
the global South4• The South provides either primary commodities or, increasingly, 
wage-labor-produced consumer goods to the North. Development serves to create wealth 
in the North, while systematically impeding economic development and self-sufficiency 
· in the South (Biel 2000) . 
. Agriculture is part of the neoliberal model of development. The agricultural bases 
of the South are destroyed by World Trade Organization5 (WTO) programs such as the 
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which privatized 
agricultural inputs and products, and the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), which 
expanded Northern agricultural production at the expense of the South through surplus 
dumping, the government-subsidized foreign sale of commodities under market price. 
WTO programs require nations of the South to import food, regardless of domestic 
availability, and force governments to cut social programs that support food production in 
the name of market liberalization (Bello 2001; Dawkins 2003). 
Within neo-liberal development models, agriculture is designed for export. The 
North supplies cheap, abundant food to the South through unrealistic price reductions and 
binding agreements imposed by global financial institutions. Food from the North 
destroys local bases of staple crop production; the South thus remains bound to monocrop 
cultivation for export and relies on the success of a few agricultural commodities. 
4 The term 'global South' or 'South' is used to denote countries called "developing," "periphery," 
"poor," "third world," or "underdeveloped," in most of the existing literature; unless otherwise 
noted, the author's original language is preserved to denote said geographies. 
5 The WTO was created in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI). GATI was established in 1948 to stimulate economic 
development after World War II. TRIPs and AOA originate from the Uruguay Round (Dawkins 
2003). 
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Consequently, agriculture is subject to the volatility of international markets. Countries 
are encouraged to produce cash crops and use earned revenue to buy staple food items 
produced more cheaply elsewhere. A cycle of debt ensues, and countries continually 
look to increase income - usually by producing more cash crops in the search for hard 
currencies (Magdoff 2004). Today, Robert Biel (2000) notes, "large-scale agriculture, 
the ·global food system, the development of scientific methods, and so on - are all 
manipulated by the global accumulation system in the interest of Northern capital" (p. 
145). 
Agriculture is now industrialized, facilitating mechanization and driving 
migration from rural to urban areas as machines are needed for production more than 
farmers. Historically, agricultural advances increased production, thus freeing up labor. 
People would not need to grow food, but now could - indeed had to - migrate to cities in 
search of work to earn money to buy food. This pattern of urbanization occurred as 
capitalism developed. With less need for farm labor, agriculture pushed people from 
rural areas, and job opportunities pulled workers into urban centers. Moreover, colonial · 
and imperial expansion provided foodstuffs for the homeland, facilitated agricultural 
expansion through incorporating new lands into production, and served as an outlet for 
overproduction by creating new markets (Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel 2000). 
Contemporary urbanization in the South is fostered by different conditions than 
past urbanization in the North. Migration to urban areas in the South is driven not by 
expansion in domestic food production, but by global capital, displacing farmers under 
both internal and external pressures originating from the contemporary economic order 
(Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel 2000). "The result" Magdoff (2004) notes, "has been the 
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explosive growth of s�ums in the third world, accompanied by misery and hungry people 
without access to land to grow their own food" (p. 2). 
Unable to grow food and lacking self-sufficiency, urban populations are 
disproportionately victimized by food insecurity (Magdoff 2004). Recent findings by the 
United Nations Population Division (2004b) that chart global population trends document 
that in.2007, for the first time in history, the global urban population will be greater than 
the global rural population (see Figure 2). This trend of global urbanization is likely to 
continue·as the effects of capitalism reach ever more remote comers of the globe. With 
more people living in cities, modem agriculture is pressed to feed more people. Fewer 
people are direct producers of food or other agriculture products. Magdoff·(2004) argues: 
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Figure 2. Global Population Trends 1950-2030 
(Source: United Nations 2004b) 
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The situation is far from static. A continuing mass migration of people 
from rural regions into the cities of the third world is underway. Some 20 
to 30 million people leave their villages each year, swelling the ranks of 
urban populations. People move to the cities in response to difficult 
conditions in rural areas (thinking that there are better prospects in the 
cities) or because they are pushed off their farms when an expanding 
capitalist farming sector takes over land or mechanizes production (pp. 1-
2). 
Although hunger has been commonplace since the advent of agriculture, it now 
persists in the context of greater quantities, of both absolute and per capita food 
production, than at any other point in human history ( see Figure 3) (Lappe, Collins, & 
Rosset 1998; Humphrey, Lewis, & Buttel 2002). Under the social and economic order 
created by capitalism, the paradox of want amid plenty, or what historian Janet 
Poppendieck (1986) eloquently describes as "bread lines knee-deep in wheat," is much 
more pronounced and systemic. 
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Figure 3. Global Food Production Trends 1961-2001 
(Source: FAOSTAT 2005) 
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Unequal access to food and the necessary requisites for capitalist agriculture 
foster food insecurity. As record levels of agricultural production have been achieved, 
· food security is now a problem of inequality �n social institutions. Problematic for the 
near future, these vast levels of production are entirely dependent on petroleum. 
Producing Food 'Rich' in Oil: Petroagriculture and Hubbert 's Peak 
Historically, expansion in agricultural production has occurred by bringing more 
land under production. In the early 1960s, agricultural expansion reached its limits, as 
hardly any land suitable for agriculture remained uncultivated. From that point on, 
increases in agricultural production have been gained through increases in yield per acre. 
Although there are examples of increasing yields per acreage achieved in pre-capitalist 
agriculture, the new increases in yield are qualitatively distinct from previous agricultural 
developments (Manning 2004a). 
The new bases for the expansion of contemporary agriculture are technological 
developments. Inappropriately dubbed the "Green Revolution," the transformation of 
agriculture post-1960 was rooted in hybridization, the crossbreeding of different plant 
strains. The remarkable gains in agriculture were dependent on high-yielding hybrid 
varieties of plants along with implementation of resource-dependent technologies 
including synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and machinery. Agriculture became 
heavily reliant on 'off-farm inputs' and capital investment (Altieri, Rosset, & Thrupp 
1998; Cook 2004; Humphrey, Lewis, & Buttel 2002; Lappe, Collins, & Rosset 1998; 
Manning 2004a). Richard Manning (2004a) notes: 
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This subtle change signaled the integration of farming into a host of 
industrial processes. Fuel for plowing was no longer farm-grown hay fed 
to farm-bred horses, but store-bought fuel fed to factory-built tractors. 
Fertilizers came from chemical plants, not the floors of stables and corrals, 
now emptied of horses. Before, farming had been uniquely autonomous 
of industry, because machines couldn' t  make food, only nature could. All 
of a sudden machines were integral to the process (p. 91). 
The new conditions of agriculture brought on by the Green Revolution were based 
on drastic changes, not only in the production of food, but in all aspects of agriculture -
from fann to plate. Beyond growing food or producing commodities, agriculture now 
involves the vertical integration of everything from growing crops to transportation, 
processing, packaging, marketing, and distribution systems (Cook 2004; Dawkins 2003; 
Humphrey, Lewi�, & Buttel 2002; Lappe, Collins, & Rosset 1998; Magdoff, Foster, & 
Buttel 2000; Manning 2004a). 
Contemporary agricultural production is extremely energy intensive.6 The key 
factor shaping contemporary agriculture and facilitating yield increases is the availability 
of cheap, abundant oil. Richard Heinberg (2003) notes, "virtually all of this increase [in 
yields per acre] was directly or indirectly attributed to energy inputs" (p. 175). The new 
hybrid varieties of the Green Revolution are specifically designed to rely on a "whole 
technical package" (Foster 1999: 118). 
We could reasonably assert that agriculture is soaked in oil. Diesel and fuel-run 
tractors and other farm machinery are used for plowing, sowing, and harvesting; in the 
field, crops are sprayed with oil-derived fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, as the 
monocrop hybrid varieties require large doses of petrochemicals to thrive, or even 
6 Input energy for food is estimated to be around 10 times the food energy produced (Hein berg 
2003; Manning 2004b) 
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survive; seeds, chemicals, and crops are transported great distances on oil-burning trucks 
and planes; as commodities, agricultural products are packaged in oil-derived plastics; the 
product must then travel again to reach the store, where consumers drive to shop 
(Heinberg 2003; Shah 2004). 
Petroleum is the main factor shaping contemporary forms of agricultural 
production. A cycle of petroleum dependence ensues: the mechanization made possible 
by oil favors large-scale agricultural production that drives further mechanization and 
monopolization of production; oil facilitates transportation whereby food can travel 
farther, making cash crops from the South available to the North in the first place; the use 
of petrochemicals destroys the natural ability of plants resist pests, leading to further 
reliance on said chemicals; and since hybrids do not breed true (meaning offspring are the 
same phenotype) by design, farmers are forced to purchase new seed stock annually 
along with .their accompanying petrol-inputs (Foster 1999; Heinberg 2003). Manning 
(2004b) notes, "Ever since we ran out of arable land, food is oil. Every single calorie we 
eat is backed by at least a calorie of oil, more like ten" (p. 42). And oil is finite. 
A Saudi saying describes the brief history of oil: "My father rode a camel. I drive 
a car. My son flies a jet airplane. His son will ride a camel." Simply stated, the age of 
oil will be a mere speck in the landscape of human history. But the problems generated 
by the foreseeable end of oil will surface long before the oil actually runs out. 
Predictions of the end of oil are centered on peak oil production, rather than the 
absolute end of recoverable oil, because peak production marks a drastic turn in socio­
ecological history. From that point on, the global economy will be on a continual 
downward slide. Global oil production will peak when roughly half of all available 
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sources have been used. At that point, the continually increasing demand for oil will 
meet a rapidly decreasing supply, since it will be impossible to extract as much petroleum 
each subsequent year (Heinberg 2004). Based on the work of geophysicist M. King 
Hubbert7, analysts currently estimate that global oil production will likely peak between 
2006 and 2016, although conservative estimates predict the global peak will come around 
2030, which is not much later. All estimates concur that the exact peak in global oil 
production will only be recognizable in hindsight (Goodstein 2004; Heinberg 2003, 2004; 
Roberts 2004; Shah 2004). 
Peak oil production will bring potentially disastrous problems. When peak oil 
production is reached, the "crisis" of the 1970s will pale in comparison.8 Agricultural 
production will be immediately and dramatically affected. As petroleum has been the 
main input in agriculture following the green revolution, contemporary modes of 
production will be increasingly more expensive and eventually altogether impossible. 
Following the global peak in oil production, petroagriculture could function for some 
time thereafter, but would require an aggressive reallocation of inputs. 
Heinberg (2003) offers this prediction: 
It is not difficult to imagine the likely agricultural consequences of 
dramatic price hikes for gasoline or diesel fuel used to run farm machinery 
or to transport food long distances, or for nitrogen fertilizers, pesticides, 
and herbicides made from oil and natural gas. The agricultural miracle of 
the 20th century may become the agricultural apocalypse of the 21 st (p. 
177). 
7 Hubbert developed a widely accepted method to predict peak oil production during the 1950s. 
8 That "crisis" was a small, temporary decline of only 7 percent in oil flow. Seemingly small, it 
was enough to create great panic within capitalism in the global North (Shah 2004 ). 
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An unplanned transformation of agriculture will exacerbate the current trends of food 
insecurity. The most vulnerable populations - urban areas, particularly in the South -
will be disproportionately impacted. In those places where people still have some access 
to arable land, a basic living can be achieved by engaging in subsistence agriculture, but 
such a solution is not possible for the urban poor. 
Greater levels of food insecurity will likely fuel more widespread global conflict. 
Extensive research, most notably the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) and Nancy 
Peluso and Michael Watts (2001 ), documents the linkages between the environment and 
conflict. The probable conflict that will accompany an unplanned end to petroagriculture 
cannot be envisioned through simplistic, deterministic linkages between environmental 
scarcity and increased violence. In fact, much research has examined the potential of 
cooperation in the face of environmental scarcity, standing in direct opposition to 
deterministic violence (Peluso & Watts 2001 ). As hunger is a problem rooted in social 
systems, it is critical to understand violence, as Peluso and Watts (2001) argue, "as a site­
specific phenomenon rooted in local histories and social relations yet connected to larger 
processes of material transformations and power relations" (p. 5). It is essential to view 
any conflict likely to accompany an unplanned end of petroagriculture in terms of "the 
political economy of access to and control over resources" (Peluso & Watts 2001:5). 
This standpoint situates violence within the context of the underlying problems of food 
insecurity today, namely inequality based in the capitalist order. 
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Beyond Organics: Analytical Stance for the Case Study 
This rese_arch examines the coming crisis of agricultural production because the 
possibility exists that the crisis can be averted. Humanity has the capacity to divest 
agricultural production from its reliance on petroleum. Sonia Shah (2004) exclaims, 
"The end of oil's story is still being written, but it is clear that the conclusion nears" (p. 
173). Whene:ver the point of peak oil production is reached, agricultural production will 
inevitably change. Many people do not see this as a potential crisis because they believe 
solutions can be easily found. 
Some analysts (and much of the public) tum to new technology as the solution for 
the crisis in agricultural production (Humphrey, Lewis, & Buttel 2002). Technological 
developments got us into the problem of extensive oil consumption, the argument goes, 
and we can surely invent our way out. These new technological solutions focus on 
finding alternative sources of energy, the use of new technology to limit the dangers of 
petroagriculture, and the creation of new genetically modified organisms to further boost 
yields. Others view the solution to the crisis in agricultural production as organic 
agriculture. Organic agriculture, supporters argue, reduces use of petroleum in 
agricultural production. And some believe that the capitalist market and political systems 
will recognize the problem and work towards prioritizing agricultural production or that 
the capitalist market� if left alone, is best suited to managing the end of petroagriculture 
(Cook 2004; Heinberg 2003; Magdoff, Foster, & Buttel 2000). 
I argue that these answers are insufficient responses to the problem of food 
insecurity. New technology will not systematically address the social problems of 
contemporary agriculture; organic agriculture does not go far enough in changing 
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petroagriculture; and the capitalist market and political systems benefit from the 
contemporary structure of global petroagriculture. 
The focus on new technology is misplaced, as it does not directly deal with the 
future problems of food security after petroagriculture. Agriculture existed for thousands 
of years before reliance on petroleum. Even if they cannot support the current global 
population alone, farming techniques implemented during that pre-petroleum period 
remain useful today. Moreover, evidence suggests that new technology alternatives 
aimed at reduction in petroleum use do not provide the intended service of actually 
reducing energy consumption. In fact, as Shah (2004) notes, the opposite effect is the 
norm: energy use increases with wide use of energy efficient technology. Fuel-efficient 
tractors, for example, lead to increases in tractor use that results in a net increase of fuel 
use. Most important, any alternative source of energy currently available is insufficient 
to replace petroleum, which is transportable, energy-dense, easily refined into many fuel 
types, and suitable for many purposes, including petrochemicals for agriculture. 
Hypothetically, oil could be rationed for non-substitutable uses, but any alternative 
source of energy will still be insufficient to maintain current levels of energy use based 
on expanding petroleum consumption (Heinberg 2003). 
The problematic relationship of agriculture to oil goes beyond the changes offered 
by organics. Organic agriculture certainly uses less petroleum used to manufacture 
pesticides and herbicides, but uses vast amounts of petroleum elsewhere, from tractors 
used on farms to transportation and distribution systems. Journalist Bill McKibben 
(2005) explains the pattern, "when organic produce started to take off, for instance, 
industrial growers soon took over much of the business, planting endless rows of organic 
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lettuce that in every respect, save the lack of pesticides, mirrored all the flaws of 
conventional agriculture" (p. 68). Thus, the reliance on petroleum could be abated by 
organics to some degree, but inequalities in access and distribution will remain. Organics 
do not address the form of food insecurity today. For the most part, organic agriculture 
facilitates the continuation of the problematic nature of agriculture by not addressing the 
problems of commodified agriculture; organics do not facilitate the realization of food 
security for all (Cook 2004). 
The capitalist market and political systems are also unable to provide an 
alternative to contemporary agricultural production as both benefit greatly from the 
current structure of agricultural production. The relationship between contemporary 
petroagriculture and capitalism is problematic. The two are inseparable. Contemporary 
food insecurity is tied directly to capitalist agriculture that produces commodities. This 
same form of agricultural production uses any available resource in the search for 
expanding profits; petroleum is integral to the vast yields per acre that bring about the 
profitability of agriculture. And, the political system is directly tied to the economic 
structure. Additionally, Manning (2004a) notes: 
The political system cannot be counted on to reform agriculture because 
any political system is a creation of agriculture, a coevolved entity. The 
major forces that shaped and shape our world - disease, imperialism, 
colonialism, slavery, trade, wealth - all are a part of the culture agriculture 
evolved (p. 187). 
If the answers to the problem of petroleum dependence for agriculture do not lie 
with technology, organics, or the political and economic system, we must look elsewhere. 
Capitalist agriculture cannot be tinkered into providing food security now, let alone after 
the global peak in oil production. The problems of agriculture must be addressed 
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holistically. Any alternative to petroagriculture must target the driving logic of the 
system. Christopher Cook (2004) explains: 
Any approach that focuses on one part of the system - such as helping 
farmers, consumers, or the environment - will indeed produce some 
benefits but will fail to deal with deeper fundamental problems underlying 
the entire food system. Today's food fight is . . .  about power and control 
over food: how it is produced, by whom, and for whom (p. 10) . 
. A great deal of discussion surrounding issues of food security focus on food 
security as a basic human right (Humphrey, Lewis, & Buttel 2002; United Nations 
2004a). Food security is commonly viewed as the adequate attainment of food for a 
population by the state. Under Green Revolution proscriptions, food security is gained 
by states through the export of cash crops and the import of foodstuffs for national 
consumption. I argue that the coming end of petroagriculture requires us to understand 
food security as self-sufficiency in staple crop production. Local production for local 
consumption is a necessary aspect of food security under materializing global realities. 
The end of abundant and cheap oil necessitates that food be produced 
geographically closer to where it is consumed and vice-versa. The end of 
petroagriculture compels a radical change in town-country relations. To the extent that 
large metropolises will remain a part of the geographical landscape following the global 
peak production of oil, urban agriculture plays a vital role in facilitating food security 
after petroagriculture. 
Under urban agriculture, production of food occurs where it is most needed, in 
cities. Problems of transportation and storage are thus eliminated. Small-scale 
production, characteristic of urban agriculture, is labor-intensive and uses less heavy 
machinery and subsequently less petroleum. As urban gardens are located in areas of 
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high population density, urban agriculture works best when local resources - animals, 
plants, soil, and water - are properly managed. Hence, using these best management 
practices reduces the use of toxic petrochemicals and conserves water. Additionally, the 
small-scale and non-specialized character of this urban agriculture facilitates nutrient 
recycling. Small-scale agriculture is typically diverse in what it produces, providing 
natural protection against disease and pests. Urban agriculture under these conditions 
also facilitates self-sufficiency, as the problem of food availability is addresses directly 
by people themselves (Rosset & Benjamin 1994). 
I suggest that the most viable long-range alternative to petroagriculture brought 
on by the eventual arrival of peak oil must be a) organic (in the broadest sense), b) local 
(in terms of proximity between production and consumption), and c) non-capitalist 
(production of food for direct consumption and not profit). Urban agriculture meets these 
conditions. Cuba has recently adopted urban agriculture as a solution to a crisis in food 
availability brought on by a drastic cut in access to petroleum. Despite its imperfections, 
urban agriculture in Cuba meets all three criteria of an alternative to petroagriculture: 
organic, local, and non-capitalist. 
My research is a descriptive study of urban agriculture in Cuba. I examine the 
factors that pushed the transformation and the process by which the transformation 
occurred. I undertake a critical assessment of contemporary food production and 
agriculture in Cuba, focusing on the existing conditions that facilitated the drastic switch 
in farming practices, the possibility and likelihood that the Cuban model might be 
adopted elsewhere, and the feasibility of urban agriculture to address the problem of food 
security in the 21 st century. 
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III. Research Strategy 
For this research I employed a historical case study. I used archival data from 
multiple sources to reconstruct the development of urban agriculture in Cuba with a 
particular focus on the factors contributing to it. 
The Case Study 
The case study is a research design focusing on one specific case. In regard to 
urban agriculture, the case study makes good sense. Cuba provides the rare opportunity 
to conduct research on urban agriculture as practiced on a large scale - that is, city- and 
nation-wide as opposed to neighborhood-wide. As the political and economic factors that 
facilitated the shift in Cuba away from the Green Revolution are already known and 
easily identified (Altieri, et al. 1999; McKibben 2005; Nieto & Delgado 2001; �osset 
2000), the case study is used here as a method of research for investigative purposes to 
identify the factors contributing to the success of the urban agriculture movement in 
Cuba. The Cuban transition away from petroagriculture, though motivated not by 
geophysical re�lities but rather by political and economic forces, serves as a global model 
because similar forces to abandon global petroagriculture were the same as for Cuba - the 
escalating costs and unavailability of petroleum. 
The case study facilitates understanding of social phenomenon in terms of what 
occurred and the specifics of why something happened (Naumes & Naumes 1999). Using 
the case study method, urban agriculture in Cuba is examined with the end goal of a 
comprehensive understanding of the nuances of the specific case. Robert Stake (1995) 
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argues, "A case study is expected to catch the complexity of a single case . . .  Case stu�y 
is the study of t4e particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its 
activity within important circumstances" (p. xi). 
Two principal advantages of the case study are close reading of data and the 
contextual "situating" afforded. The case study provides an opportunity to paint a full 
picture of the.phenomena under investigation. Moreover, the case study situates the 
research within the broader scope of global history and geography through 
contextualization (Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg 1991). 
Case study, like any research method, has some limits. Its main disadvantage is 
the "difficulty in generalizing from the results of these studies, in extrapolating the results 
of single case research into a larger context" (Naumes & Naumes 1999:59). Thus, while 
the conclusions reached may indeed be relevant to other experiences with urban 
agriculture, further research is needed to confirm this. However, this limitation of the 
case study is less problematic in light of this specific research project. 
The goal of this research is not to generalize the precise experiences of urban 
agriculture in Cuba, but to understand how the case may provide lessons for urban 
agriculture elsewhere; the purpose is not to generalize, but to learn. This case study may 
generate potential lessons for other nations. 
Data Sources 
Cuban agriculture is studied in historical context using archival data. Within this 
context, urban agriculture in Cuba is examined from 1989 through 2004. The starting 
date, 1989, was chosen specifically for the purposes of identifying the particulars of the 
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development of urban. agriculture in Cuba following the collapse of the Soviet trade bloc 
and subsequent loss of agricultural inputs, including petroleum, to Cuba. 
Data sources for the research project include literature (i.e. books, journal articles, 
news reports, and conference proceedings) that document the transition to urban 
agriculture in Cuba. Official reports from both national and international governing 
bodies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide data on global geophysical 
trends and the Cuban case as it relates to these conditions. 
In order to ensure accuracy of secondary data sources, this case study is 
conducted using· a triangulation of sources. Stake (1995) explains, "To describe the case, 
we try to present a substantial body of uncontestable description. We want to tell quite a 
bit about the case that almost anyone, who had our opportunity to observe it, would have 
noticed and recorded, much as we did" (p. 110). Triangulation of sources provides for 
the examination and utilization of multiple sources and data of multiple origins, thus 
enhancing the validity of conclusions (Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg 1991 ; Stake 1 995). 
The case of Cuba is examined through in-depth analysis of secondary data sources 
that present the story of urban agriculture in Cuba as completely as possible, specifically 
seeking to understand its complexity. To be sure, urban agriculture in Cuba could be 
examined using quantitative methods of social science research. But the literary­
narrative approach - a method for revealing findings through qualitative analysis -
adopted here facilitates analysis that strikes at the root of the problems of contemporary 
agricultural production and draws attention to possible alternatives. 
The literary-narrative approach can be precise and disciplined - and at the 
same time graphic, readable, and imaginative. As with the novel, the 
narrative form permits the sociological researcher to tell a story, a story 
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with actors, action, and a background, even one that may possess a 
compelling plot. Vivid description is not the less scientific because it is 
descriptive (Orum, Feagin, & Sjoberg 1991 :20). 
The story of Cuban agriculture provides insights for the future of global food 
production. Telling this story through historical analysis provides a glimpse of food 
security in a post-peak oil world. 
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IV. 'rhe Cuban Experience: Food Security Before and After Petroagriculture 
Beginning with the origins of the Cuban Revolution almost fifty years ago, food 
security has remained a high priority for the nation of Cuba. · However, the Cuban 
approach to food security has been altered throughout history in response to differing 
material conditions. A full grasp of agriculture in Cuba today, including the achievement 
of food security under changing conditions of production, depends on a basic 
understanding of the history of agriculture in Cuba. Cuban agronomist Fernando Funes 
(2002) explains, "In order to understand the organic farming movement and sustainable 
agriculture in Cuba, one must begin with the history of Cuban agriculture" (p. 3) . This 
history provides the context for the problems Cuba faced in pursuing food security at 
various points in time. Additionally, the selected history clarifies my use of Cuba as a 
case study with the potential to generate insights about food security in a post­
petroagriculture world. 
The history of Cuban agriculture is a microcosm of global agricultural history. 
Cuba's agricultural sector once exemplified the prescriptions of the Green Revolution in 
many respects; contemporary urban agriculture in Cuba foreshadows future global 
agriculture by operating without petroleum inputs and, thus, exemplifies an alternative to 
petroagriculture. 
After a brief history of Cuban agriculture prior to the 1959 Revolution, I offer a 
selective history of Cuban agriculture that examines agriculture and food security in 
Revolutionary Cuba before and during the Special Period in Peacetime. The Special 
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Period as a historical division exemplifies both global contemporary petroagriculture and 
a transformation in agriculture following a global peak in oil production. 
Agriculture in Cuba Prior to the Revolution 
Once Cuba was established as a colony for Spanish plunder with the 'discovery' 
of the Americas in the 15th century, sugar production was developed to serve colonial 
interests. Sugar retained its importance through Cuba's different socio-historical 
identities - colonial subject of Spain, client of the United States, and dependent of the 
Soviet Union (Perez 1988). 
The role sugar played in shaping the character of Cuba cannot be understated.9 It 
is even said that the history of Cuba is the history of sugar. Historian Louis Perez (1988) 
posits, "The influence of sugar . . .  was pervasive and total . . .  In the end, sugar shaped 
the national character" (p. ix). 
Cuba was formally colonized during the early 16th century. The native Indian 
societies were immediately destroyed through conquest and most survivors of the original 
conquest died soon after colonization. Food insecurity was commonplace, creating 
conditions ripe for infection and illness. Most notable was the introduction of export­
oriented agriculture. Perez (1988) notes, "Spain introduced a new economic purpose to 
the island, and nowhere did this change of purpose stand in sharper relief than the new 
function of land. European agriculture displaced Indian farming" (p. 28). Coffee, sugar, 
9 A sustained discussion of sugar's role throughout Cuban history is much too complex for the 
scope of this project. For a more comprehensive analysis see Perez 1988, 2001 .  
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and tobacco were cultivated for export. As a Spanish colony, agriculture in Cuba was 
developed to serve colonial interests (Perez 1988). 
Cuban agriculture was relatively diverse and balanced until the middle of the 19th 
century, when the "scale slowly tilted against diversified agriculture and in favor of 
sugar" (Perez 2001 :92). From that point on, Perez (2001) observes, "the die was cast" (p. 
108). The Cuban agricultural economy was essentially based on one crop, sugar, and 
would grow to 90 percent of Cuba's total exports by value over the next century. The 
growing importance of sugar for the Cuban economy, Perez ( 1988) notes, "came at the 
expense of everything else" (p. 77). Sugar systematically undermined Cuban 
development. 
During approximately the same period, Cuba struggled. On February 24, 1895 
the Cuban war for independence began under the leadership of Jose Marti. Recognizing 
the immanent defeat of the Spanish by the Cubans, the U.S. intervened in the Cuban 
struggle for sovereignty, driven by the opportunity to gain control over the island. Perez 
(1988) comments: 
The intervention changed everything, as it was meant to. A Cuban war of 
liberation was transformed into a U.S. war of conquest . . .  So it was that 
the Cuban war for national liberation was transfigured into the 'Spanish -
American War,' nomenclature that denied Cuban participation and 
presaged the next series of development" (p. 178). 
After almost four centuries of colonization, Cuba finally won independence from 
Spain, only to become an official possession of the U.S. on January 1 ,  1899. Cuba went 
from colony to U.S. client state in short order (Perez 1988). 
The war for independence ravaged Cuba's agricultural sector, and thus left the 
island in economic ruins. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Cuban agriculture 
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was developed similar to colonized Cuba - generally, sugar production served external 
interests. U.S. c,ontrol over sugar expanded and by 1905 it was estimated that 75 percent 
of all land in Cuba was owned by foreign interests. Perez (1988) explains, "Cubans had 
achieved self-government without self-determination and independence without 
sovereignty" (p. 192). 
Cuban opposition to U.S. control was strong from the outset. Cubans organized 
and rebelled against the U.S. throughout the first half of the 20th century. In the 1950s, 
the struggle against the U.S. and its supporters developed into full-blown revolutionary 
warfare. The origins of Cuban discontent lay to a large extent in its agricultural 
monoculture causing socio-economic dissatisfaction accompanied by growing political 
grievance. Perez (1988) explains: 
Throughout the 1950s, Cuba was experiencing economic dislocation. 
Cubans continued to suffer from the vagaries of an export economy, and 
relief was nowhere in sight. Vulnerability to the effects of price 
fluctuations in the international sugar market and the boom-bust cycles 
continued to play havoc with all sectors of the Cuban economy. By the 
1950s sugar had ceased to be a source of economic growth and could not 
sustain continued economic development (p. 295). 
In both rural and urban areas, Cuban resistance against the U.S.-propped 
government grew. The economy was unable to support the Cuban population. The 
overall impoverished conditions under which many Cubans lived, particularly those in 
rural areas, facilitated the expansion of armed struggle. The guerrilla movement grew 
quickly and enjoyed widespread support. "Social undercurrents ran deep during the late 
1950s and contributed to transforming the struggle . . .  from a political contest between 
elite power contenders into a more ambiguous movement for socio-economic change" 
(Perez 1988:303). 
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Agriculture and Food Security During the Cuban Revolution 
Revolution was successful in Cuba in 1959 under the leadership of Fidel Castro. 
Cubans were finally able to free themselves from the U.S. control that gripped the nation 
· following the successful struggle against Spanish rule (Perez 1988). The Revolution is 
still alive today, and Cuba remains a sovereign state under the self-rule won in 1959. 
From the beginning of the Revolution, Cuba has consistently remained dedicated 
to food security (Rosset 2000). Marcos Nieto and Ricardo Delgado (2002) posit, "If one 
were to look at the first four decades of the Cuban Revolution, what stands out are the 
positive steps taken by the Cuban government to assure food availability" (p. 40). 
Strategies to achieve food security, however, changed over time. 
An initial goal of the Revolution was to reverse the underdevelopment of Cuba 
resulting from sugar dependence. The plan was to reduce the role of sugar in the Cuban 
economy through programs aimed at industrialization and the diversification of 
agricultural production (Crawford 2003; Enriquez 2000; Perez 1988). Perez (1988) 
explains: 
Agricultural diversification promised to reduce agricultural imports, 
increase national production, and promote new exports. The idea was 
quite simple. Too much emphasis had been given to sugar. Foreign 
exchange was being spent on goods that could be produced in Cuba (p. 
337). 
This strategy was not a total abandonment of sugar production, but a basic reduction of 
production to lower, stable levels and a divestment of wholesale economic reliance on 
one good. Additionally, Perez ( 1988) explains, "Cuban planners also hoped to achieve 
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self-sufficiency in food production" (p. 338). The initial plan of the Revolution was to 
achieve food security through self-reliance. 
These developmental strategies were sound in theory but they were not fully 
implemented because of externally imposed constraints. In 1960, less than a year after 
the success of the Revolution, the United States instituted an embargo against Cuba in 
response to the nationalization of U.S. holdings. The embargo undermined the Cuban 
economy as the U.S. cancelled its sugar order, creating dire conditions for many parts of 
the country. Although agricultural diversification was an initial goal of the Revolution, 
extensive failures in the agricultural sector forced the abandonment of such efforts. In 
fact, dependence on foreign imports of foodstuffs increased, as did Cuban reliance on 
sugar exports. Cuban efforts to industrialize and achieve self-sufficiency in food 
production were unsuccessful (Enriquez 2000; Perez 1988). 
With few options, Cuba turned to the Soviet bloc for economic assistance. The 
Soviet bloc offered Cuba favorable trade conditions for sugar. The Soviets were engaged 
in the Cold War, a power struggle against the U.S., from the 1950s through the 1980s. 
Thus, they had their own vested geopolitical interest in Cuba. The geographical location 
of Cuba was enticing to the Soviet bloc and Cuba served on the front line of the Cold 
War (Perez 1988). 
Armando Nova (2002) explains that historical success in sugar production and 
trade with the Soviet bloc created "a secure market [for sugar], with long-term, stable, 
and preferential prices. This led to a decision to reconsider the reduction of area devoted 
to sugarcane, thus prolonging [Cuban] dependence on a one-product farming system" (p. 
29). Already possessing the labor, knowledge, ecological characteristics, and experience 
34 
for sugar production, Cuba became wholly committed, and sugar production became a 
national priority. As Perez (1988) declares, "This was not simply an objective - it 
· became an obsession" (p. 339). Cubans became transfixed by the goal of collective 
advancement promised by sugar production. 
Cuba was pushed toward state planning to compensate for the loss of U.S. 
management over Cuban production, resources, and distribution. As Perez ( 1988) 
explains, "The crisis with the United States, moreover, climaxing in the trade embargo, 
increased the importance of state planning to reorganize Cuban industry around Soviet 
exports and facilitate the integration of Cuban trade with the socialist bloc" (p. 328). 
The Soviet bloc relationship meant that Cuba's agricultural sector developed in a 
manner similar to that of other third world countries. The methods of national 
development entailed an increase in agricultural production for export to generate capital 
for agricultural investment (in the form of inputs) to increase production of agricultural 
commodities (Enriquez 2000; Nova 2002; Perez 1988; Rosset 2000). 
Cuban agricultural production, then, was characterized by heavy dependence on 
imported agrichemicals, hybrid seeds, machinery, and petroleum. Peter Ros set and 
Medea Benjamin (1994) explain, "Cuban agriculture was based on large-scale, capital­
intensive monoculture, more similar in many ways to the Central Valley of California 
than to the typical Latin American minifundio" (p. 3). The agricultural sector in general, 
and sugar in particular, was industrialized at the onset of the Soviet relationship 
(Enriquez 2000). Funes (2002) depicts the degree to which Cuban agriculture was 
industrialized: 
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On the average, 1,300,000 tons of chemical fertilizers and 600,000 tons of 
feed concentrates for livestock production were used every year, together 
with $80. million worth of pesticides. The number of tractors employed in 
Cuban agriculture grew to 90,000, as the number of oxen teams shrank to 
less than 100,000. In the first three decades of this period, the favorable 
terms of trade Cuba received from socialist countries, especially the Soviet 
Union, made such heavy investment in this agricultural model possible (p. 
5). 
Cuba's economy quickly became more industrialized than did any other Latin American 
country (Rosset 2000). 
Food security in Cuba was made possible by the long-standing commitment of the 
Revolution to social equity and the trade enjoyed with the Soviet bloc. Cuban sugar was 
exported to earn revenue to purchase adequate supplies of food, which was available to 
Cubans through equitable distribution patterns. Cubans had access to food through a 
variety of avenues: a rationing system established by the Cuban state that guaranteed 
basic foodstuffs to all households; sufficient wages and low unemployment supported the 
ability of Cubans to buy food at state-reduced prices; meals provided at work and schools 
supplied at least one meal per day to many Cubans; and both the "grey market" (the trade 
of food rations, i.e. unneeded milk for needed eggs) and the black market supplemented 
rationing and food markets (Perez 1988; Rosset 2000). For the most part, food security 
was achieved through the import of food, coupled with an equitable food access and 
distribution system. Perez (1988) notes, "In this fashion, the revolution achieved one of 
· its most dramatic achievements: the elimination of malnutrition" (p. 361). 
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Cuban nutritional needs were all but fully met by the 1970s - not, to be 
sure, with any great quantity or with great variety, but with certainty, 
regularity, and sufficiency. Malnutrition was all but eliminated. By the 
early 1980s, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
estimated the Cuban daily per capita calorie intake at 2,705, considerably 
above most Latin American countries and above the generally recognized 
minimum daily requirement of 2,500 calories (Perez 1988 :362). 
During the Revolution, Cuba imported approximately two thirds of its food and 
almost all of its agricultural inputs, including fuel. Farming in Cuba was fully 
industrialized with many inputs and was entirely dependent on petroleum: large, 
centrally-controlled farms, an agricultural sector based on mono-crop export, with great 
reliance on technology and inputs in the form of petrochemicals, herbicides, pesticides, 
and inorganic fertilizers. Cuba's population was fed, but production was unmistakably 
industrial, and thus dependent on petroleum inputs and global trade (Altieri, et al. 1999; 
Funes 2002; Nieto & Delgado 2002). 
Food security was achieved during the Revolution by essentially following the 
guidelines of the Green Revolution: produce cash crops for export using industrialized 
modes of production and import foodstuffs for national consumption. Throughout the 
Revolution, Cuba became increasingly dependent on its relationship to the Soviet bloc, as 
Nova (2002) explains: 
This [decrease in food production] came about in an intensive 
development model, based on high levels of external inputs and a high 
external dependence (mainly machinery, fuel, and agrochemicals); similar 
to the situation faced by other countries applying the same productionist 
model (p. 38). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba remained aware of the need to try 
agricultural diversification again as a long-term strategy for food security. As a new 
developmental strategy forged during this time, Cuba worked to provide more local 
political power or poder popular (people's power). This democratization project, 
coupled with planning improvements, helped to reduce sugar dependence. 
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Diversification reduced sugar dependency and the sugar declined as part of the total value 
of Cuba exports .. Cuba maintained its commitment to food security and began the path 
toward increased self-sufficiency in food production (Perez 1988). 
Revolutionary Cuba also put great emphasis on education. Perez (1988) explains, 
"Indeed, nowhere was the quest for an egalitarian society more fully attained than in the 
area of education" (p. 358). Education was used to develop and strengthen political 
support for the Revolution, boost economic activity, and facilitate Cuban development. 
During the Revolution, the illiteracy rate fell from approximately 25 percent to become 
virtually nonexistent. . Extensive gains were made in other areas of education, particularly 
in advanced training (Perez 1988). McKibben (2005) notes the undeniable success: 
"Fidel Castro, as even his fiercest opponents would admit, has almost from the day he 
took power spent lavishly on the country's educational system. Cuba's ratio of teachers 
to students is akin to Sweden's; people who want to go to college go to college" (p. 64). 
Into the 1980s, Cuba faced tough material realities, but the Revolution remained 
alive and well. "The combination of sustained economic growth and political stability, 
backed by Soviet economic support and credit subsidies, allowed Cuba to fulfill many of 
the most ambitious programs of the revolution" (Perez 1988:356). 
Despite great progress in pursuing a development path toward self-sufficiency, 
Cuba remained more or less dependent upon the production of one crop until the Soviet 
trade bloc crisis that fully materialized in 1989. To be sure, food security was achieved 
through adequate access and distribution programs, but their food security was dependent 
on a model of agricultural production that defies any notion of security, stability, or 
sustainability. 
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Food Security During the Special Period in Peacetime 
In 1989 economic stagnation provoked the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The 
Soviet influence declined globally as the neoliberal agenda conquered ever-farther lands. 
Instantaneously, socialist alternatives disappeared around the world and the capitalist 
mode of production proliferated globally. The situation quickly became dire for Cuba, 
which no longer had a supplier for the extensive inputs on which the country had become 
dependent. Nor did Cuba have markets for its exports. The Soviet bloc supported 85 
percent of Cuba's trade. After its collapse, Cuban imports dropped 75 percent and 
exports were reduced 79 percent; the deficit reached 33 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). A reduction in oil imports by more than 50 percent diminished the availability of 
fuel ne_eded to run the Cuban economy, and also destroyed the base of Cuba's foreign 
exchange through the re-export of oil, a major source of revenue for the cash-strapped 
country (Altieri, et al. 1999; Enriquez 2000; McKibben 2005; Murphy 1999; Nieto & 
Delgado 2001; Rosset 2000). 
The ensuing economic crisis completely undermined Cuban food security. 
Availability of fertilizers and pesticides plunged by more than 80 percent, and fuel and 
other petroleum products dropped by more than 50 percent. Food production became 
Cuba's most immediate need as the imports that formerly provided 50 percent of the 
caloric intake of the population disappeared virtually overnight. It is estimated that 
during the early 1990s, caloric and protein intake by Cubans dropped as much as 30 
percent below levels in the 1980s - from almost 3,000 calories a day to 1,900. Urban 
areas in particular were devastated, causing widespread problems in a country where 
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approximately 75 percent of the population lives in cities. The lack of fuel for shipping 
meant that the food still available from Cuba's rur�l areas and sources from abroad were 
no longer able reach the urban population (Altieri, et al. 1999; Enriquez 2000; McKibben 
2005; Murphy 1999; Nieto & Delgado 2001; Rosset 2000; United Nations 2004b). 
Cuba's dedication to food equity was seriously challenged. After 1989, Cuba, no 
longer able to access the imports that the entire economy had become accustomed to, 
needed new ways to feed the population and to maintain social equity. The situation was 
exacerbated as the twice-strengthened U.S. embargo isolated the nation from the rest of 
the world. The U.S. saw the Soviet collapse as a chance to finally destroy the tiny nation 
(Nieto & Delgado 2001; Perez 2002; Rosset 2000). McKibben (2005) explains: 
The United States, Cuba's closet neighbor, enforced a strict trade embargo 
and Cuba had next to no foreign exchange with anyone else - certainly the 
new Russia no longer wanted to pay a premium on Cuban sugar for the 
simple glory of supporting a tropical version of its Leninist past . . . In 
other words, Cuba became an island. Not just a real island, surrounded by 
water, but something much rarer : an island outside the international 
economic system, a moon base whose supply ships had suddenly stopped 
coming (pp. 61 -2). 
Despite the dire conditions now faced by Cuba, Nieto and Delgado (2002) 
explain, "a fundamental decision was made to maintain the principles of social equity 
established by the revolutionary government" (p. 47). U.S. policy, intended to overthrow 
the Revolution, actually had the opposite effect and solidified Cuban resolve; the more 
the U.S. pushed, the more Cuba resisted. Cuba remained dedicated to survival and the 
Cuban government in 1991  declared the "Special Period in Peacetime" in response to the 
crisis, effectively placing the country on an austerity program similar to periods of war, 
and quickly began to devise solutions for the new problems. The entire country was 
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reorganized to contribute to the continued existence of the Revolution by adapting to 
changing conditions (Altieri, et al. 1999; Crawford 2003; Murphy 1999; Rosset 2000). 
Human resources were mobilized to meet the needs of the country. Cuba was, in 
fact, prepared to handle the grave conditions that arose after the Sovie� collapse. Since 
the Revolution, Cuba emphasized the advancement and education of its citizens. 
Emphasis on the development of national capabilities between 1 959 and 1989 equipped 
the nation with the flexibility to respond to the crisis. Although Cuba has only 2 percent 
of the population of Latin America, it has almost 1 1  percent of its scientists. Moreover, 
Cuban scientists were already conducting research on agricultural alternatives prior to 
1989. During the Special Period, their research was intensified and findings were 
systematically implemented (Rosset 2000; Rosset & Benjamin 1994). 
To feed its population, Cuba initiated the largest effort in history to convert 
industrialized agriculture to organic farming. "In doing so" McKibben (2005) posits: 
they have created what may be the world's largest working model of a 
semi-sustainable agriculture, one that doesn't rely nearly as heavily as the 
rest of the world does on oil, on chemicals [derived from petroleum], on 
shipping vast quantities of food back and forth [ also heavily dependent on 
oil] (p. 62). 
Alternatives for the now unavailable inputs were needed across the entire agricultural 
sector. Chemical inputs were replaced by biological substitutes : biopesticides, natural 
enemies, resistant plant varieties, crop rotations, and cover cropping to suppress weeds. 
Biofertilizers substituted for synthetic ones: earthworms, compost, other organic 
fertilizers, manures, and integration of grazing animals with crops ( creating manure, and 
providing aeration). Animals were used instead of tractors, reducing the need for fuel, 
tires, and spare parts. Organic farming also requires the one input abundant in Cuba (and 
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much of the world): labor (Altieri, et al. 1999; Crawford 2003; Koont 2004; Murphy 
1999; Rosset 2�). 
Food has remained adequately available to all Cuban citizens since the Revolution 
and particularly through the difficult extremes of the recent Special Period by employing 
a variety of tools. First, food has remained within physical and economic reach of the 
entire population (including schools and hospitals) through regulated food entitlements 
and the continuation of rationing programs that were first implemented by the Cuban 
revolution. Secondly, food is often distributed from producers voluntarily, out of a sense 
of Cuban solidarity (Koont 2004; Nieto & Delgado 2002). There are also state-based 
competitors that offer alternatives to farmers' markets through placitas topadas (limited 
price) markets. The most important provision securing food distribution is that land, the 
primary means of food production, is available to all Cubans for free. As Koont (2004) 
points out: 
This principle has enabled work collectives, from state farms and 
industrial enterprises to schools and hospitals, to put nearby idle land to 
good use by raising crops and animals for the consumption of the workers 
in workplace cafeterias. It has also enabled individuals who are not 
officially integrated into the agricultural workforce on state farms, such as 
retirees, to ask for small parcels of land to produce their own food (p. 19). 
The development of Cuban agriculture during the Special Period systematically 
reversed the underdevelopment of the nation based on sugar production. The 
. diversification of agriculture, long a goal of the Revolution, was realized. "It is the 
reverse, that is, of the Green Revolution that spread across the globe in the 1960s, an 
industrialization of the food system that relied on irrigation, oil, and the massive 
application of chemicals to counter every problem" (McKibben 2005:65). 
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Urban Agriculture During the Special Period 
An important element of the alternative agricultural plan in Cuba is organic urban 
food production. "Urban agriculture reemerged recently in this new context for several 
reasons: the economic difficulties of the 1990s; the low quality of vegetables on the 
market; shortages of traditional spices and seasonings; and the under-exploited 
production potential of cities" (Companioni, et al. 2002:221 ). 
'Urban' agriculture has no widely agreed upon definition. Additionally, 'organic' 
is used in a wide variety of ways to denote any number of cultivation techniques. In 
Cuba, urban organic agriculture is generally defined as food production within a city's 
regulatory limits, or officially recognized periphery, that uses no synthetic fertilizers, 
pesticides, or herbicides (Crawford 2003). It "refers to the cultivation and production of 
agricultural products, including edible, medicinal, and decorative plants, grown without 
the assistance of chemical agents, and within the outside limits of the official peripheral 
borders of Cuban municipalities" (Crawford 2003:743). 
Small-scale organop6nicos (the Cuban term for all urban gardens) are necessarily 
diverse in production and participatory. Diversity in production is used as ·a tool to 
maximize yield in urban agriculture, similar to any other type of small-scale agricultural 
production. In this case, diversity serves as a natural protection against pests and makes 
possible a cycle of harvests throughout the year. The small-scale characteristic of urban 
agriculture increases labor needs, as animal power and mechanization are not a 
possibility; urban agriculture thus encourages widespread participation (McKibben 
2005). 
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Three broad notions guide urban production in Cuba: organic cultivation, use of 
resources in accordance with local needs, and direct distribution of goods to consumers. 
Organic methods protect the local environment and the health of consumers. Local 
conditions guide the use of local resources to facilitate sustainability and reduce the 
agricultural sector's interference with other urban activities. Consumers are provided 
direct access to foodstuffs in the pursuit of realizing food security for all citizens 
(Companioni, et al. 2001). 
Urban gardens began to emerge all over Havana in the early 1990s to counter the 
food crisis. Many analysts agree that this trend of urban agriculture began as a popular 
response in the truest sense: food was needed, so the population grew it (Altieri 2002; 
Altieri, et al. 1999; Companioni, et al. 2002; Crawford 2003; Funes 2002; Gonzalez 
2003; Koont 2004; Murphy 1999; Rosset 2000; Rosset & Bourque 2002). Peter Rosset 
(2000) describes the grassroots spread of urban agriculture: "Formerly vacant lots and 
backyards in all Cuban cities now sport food crops and animal farms, and fresh produce 
is sold from private stands throughout urban areas at prices substantially below those 
prevailing in the farmers' markets" (p. 210). 
Originally, urban organic agriculture as a popular movement was "disorganized in 
both scale and type" (Crawford 2003:745). As there was no formal government oversight 
of the movement, every form of agricultural production - from roadside gardens and 
patio production to large farms outside the city center - was considered part of the urban 
agriculture movement. The movement extends beyond typical backyard gardening and 
urban agriculture provides a significant amount of produce for Cuban consumption 
(Crawford 2003; Koont 2004). 
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Urban agriculture has spread across Cuba in recent years, and has become·a large 
contributor to food production. The urban agriculture movement has provided great 
assistance in the fight against hunger without �troleum and in the midst of economic 
crisis. As a popular movement, it emerged ·quickly (Crawford 2003; Koont 2004; 
McKibben 2005; Murphy 1999; Rosset 2000) . 
. Formal government support followed the grassroots movement in short order. 
The organoponicos were "augmented by· state support, both through technological and 
informational services and through the establishment of extensive state-run gardens, 
which produce horticulture products for local residents" (Altieri, et al. 1999:132). In 
. 1993, the Cuban government introduced policy that provided access to land for food 
production to anyone not incorporated into another food provisioning system. Self­
sufficiency was coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) in an effort, as 
Laura Enriquez (2000) explains, to "ease the pressure on official channels of food 
distribution, as well as to reduce potential discontent about food shortages, by permitting 
people to grow their own food" (p. 7). 
As the food crisis intensified, government support of urban agriculture expanded 
rapidly due to public pressure. The movement grew in both size and tangible success. 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) took this popular movement 
very seriously, and by 1994 had created a specific Urban Agriculture 
Department. Together with the Provincial Office of Poder Popular, they 
set out to provide support services and material resources for the urban 
gardeners of the capital and other cities (Altieri, et al. 1999: 134). 
The oversight of urban agriculture by MINAGRI, beginning in 1994 with the creation of 
the Urban Agriculture Department, was strengthened three years later with urban land­
reform policy. Crawford (2003) notes that the official step of government oversight was 
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strengthened in 1 997 with Resolution No. 527 /97, which formally provided up to one­
third of an acre for urbanites to cultivate crops in and around major Cuban cities. 
Urban agricultural programs were implemented using a variety of tools and 
diverse tactics to ensure success. The Cuban government supported urban agriculture 
through regulation, market incentives, voluntary partnership approaches, land reform, 
cultivation assistance, and by promoting education and providing public information 
(Companioni, et al. 2002). According to Catherine Murphy ( 1999), MINA GI created the 
"world's first coordinated urban agriculture program" {p. 1 1 ). It entailed: 1 )  land access 
for Cubans, 2) agricultural extens_ion programs, 3) research and development for 
improving urban agriculture, 4) an extensive network of supply stores, and 5) marketing 
opportunities directed toward meeting urban needs. 
Government support of urban agriculture was integral to the success of alternative 
agriculture in Cuba (Companioni, et al. 2002; Enriquez 2000; Murphy 1999). In 
particular, the government guaranteed access to land, fundamental for food production. 
Access to land facilitated the successful development of urban agriculture throughout 
Cuba. According to Nelso Companioni, Yanet Ojeda Hernandez, Egidio Paez, and 
Catherine Murphy (2002), government support is guided by certain principles, including: 
46 
Equitable food distribution 
Local production linked to community needs 
Animal and crop integration 
Organic fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides to protect future generations 
Cultivation of all available land 
Interdisciplinary research applied for the benefit of all 
Direct access to fresh produce 
Best use of production possibilities 
The Urban Agriculture Department attends to all aspects of urban agriculture. 
The department is comprised of a wide variety of participants in the movement - urban 
farmers, specialists, and members of the government from different scientific and 
government institutions. The Cuban government has twenty-six administrative sub­
programs specifically geared toward supporting urban agriculture (see Figure 4). 
I .Soil management and conservation 14. Oilseed crops 
2. Organic matter 15 .  Beans 
3. Seeds 16. Animal feeds 
4. Irrigation and water 17 .  Apiculture 
5. Vegetables and fresh herbs 18. Poultry 
6. Medicinal plants and dried herbs 19. Rabbit breeding 
7. Ornamental plants and flowers 20. Sheep and goats 
8. Fruit trees 21 . Swine 
9. Shade houses 22. Cows 
10. Small-scale "popular" rice production 23. Aquaculture 
1 1 .  Trees, coffee, and cocoa 24. Marketing 
12. Small-scale "popular" plantain 25. Small-scale agro-industry 
production 
13. Tropical roots and tubers 26. Science, technology, training, and 
environmental issues 
Figure 4. Sub-programs of Urban Agriculture 
(Source: Companioni, et al. 2001) 
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Together, these programs provide support in a variety of agricultural sectors, for 
people engaged in urban agriculture at all levels, and use a wide array of means to 
facilitate this support. All of the sub-programs are aimed at providing direct support to 
areas most in need. As they are coordinated on a local level, the sub-programs are 
responsive to local needs (Companioni, et al. 2002). 
Popular Councils (local government at the neighborhood level) each have 
representatives and/or agricultural delegates to coordinate the local urban agriculture 
programs. This local control fosters understanding of the unique characteristics of local 
systems and provides the ability to adequately address the local needs. Popular Councils 
also oversee local. service and technical provisions such as the extension services, 
research and development, and supply stores (Companioni, et al. 2003; Koont 2004; 
Murphy 1999). 
The Municipal Urban Farm Enterprise coordinates all urban agricultural activities 
of the Popular Council, including organizing production, determining appropriate 
technology for a given area, and choosing local inputs and local land potential. 
Additionally, Municipal Urban Farm Enterprises have the necessary infrastructure to 
provide technical and extension activities. Assistance is also provided through scientific 
resources, education programs, and service centers. Service centers offer technical 
advice and information along with seeds, organic compost and fertilizers, and natural pest 
and disease control (Companioni, et al. 2003; Koont 2004; Murphy 1999). 
Government support in the form of technology and research provides farmers 
with tools, knowledge and concrete assistance (i.e. seeds, pest control, management 
techniques, etc.) integral to the success of agricultural production. In 2003, one million 
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tons of natural compost was produced in hundreds of vermicompost centers, and 
distributed to urban farmers. The Crop Protection Institute provided farmers with natural 
pest control, such as insects and microorganisms (Koont 2004: 15). Education initiatives 
share research, techniques, and knowledge with farmers and ensure that young people are 
equipped to carry on agriculture production in the future . 
. Training of urban farmers is critical to perfecting the production 
technologies being employed . . . We have built an extension system, 
which counts on the participation of its own extension agents, plus 
research centers, the most experienced farmers and gardeners, and other 
individuals and institutions related to urban agriculture. Extension is at all 
times tailored to local conditions and needs, providing farmers with the 
latest theoretical and practical information (Companioni, et al. 2002:233). 
A basic goal of the agricultural component in the Special Period was to improve 
local food production and realize food security in Cuba through self-sufficiency. On the 
whole, this initial goal has been realized. Sinan Koont (2004) notes: 
By the end of 2002, the goal of providing every settlement of over fifteen 
houses with its own food production capacity - whether organop6nicos, 
group gardens, or individual plots - has essentially been met, and over 
18,00 hectares were being cultivated in urban agriculture in and around 
cities (p. 13). 
Urban agriculture now supplies an ever-larger amount of fresh produce for the Cuban 
population. "By the summer of 2003, the number of patios in production had exceeded 
300,000, with a goal for the future of over half a million patios" (Koont 2004: 13). 
Growing food is now commonplace in urban areas and patios, yards, and balconies 
support the urban agricultural movement. 
49 
Evaluation of Achieved Food Security 
By all accounts, Cuba's handling of the food crisis initiated by the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc has been a success. Cuba's aim was to change the mode of agricultural 
production in ways that did not depend on oil. This success can be measured in 
numerous ways. In concrete terms of food production, statistics indicate the achievement 
of the intended outcomes of the agricultural sector during the Special Period (see Figure 
5). Cuba has overcome food shortages and actually reached record levels of food 
production in 1997 in ten of thirteen food staples (Koont 2004; Rosset 2000). 
Urban farming has been crucial to this accomplishment. In 1999 the urban sector 
alone produced more than 800,000 tons of food. By 2000, food production exceeded pre­
crisis levels on all accounts. And, by 2004, the City of Havana was essentially self­
sufficient in the production of produce (Koont 2004; McKibben 2005; Nieto & Delgado 
2001 ; Rosset 2000). 
In addition to achieving the stated goals of maintaining food security through self­
sufficiency, the agricultural shift in Cuba fostered unintended benefits, namely the 
improvement of the agricultural sector's impacts on the environment and the creation of . 
jobs. Because of its proximity to large populations, urban agriculture needs to be 
organic. In fact, Cuban policy prohibits fertilizers within city limits. The agricultural 
shift has reduced groundwater contamination from pesticide and fertilizer runoff, 
facilitated biodiversity through the elimination of monoculture, and lessens soil erosion 
and degradation. Transportation changes due to local production have further reduced oil 
consumption (Altieri, et al. 1999). 
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Small-scale organic agriculture is labor-intensive. Urban agriculture created 
many jobs acros� many sectors - from farmers to research and extension agents. In 2002 
alone, 35,000 new jobs were created, amounting to approximately 22 percent of all new 
jobs in Cuba and by 2003 over 200,000 workers were employed in the urban agriculture 
sector (Companioni, et al. 2002; Koont 2004). 
Lessons may be learned from Cuba's experience attaining food security through 
self-sufficiency after petroagriculture collapsed. If Cuba is to serve as an example, the 
factors that most contributed to the success of urban agriculture in Cuba must be 
examined. The question is: how did Cuban agriculture meet the criteria of being organic, 
local, and non-capitalist - the requisites for a successful alternative to petroagriculture? 
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V. Agriculture Transformed: Analysis and Implications of Cuba's Experience 
Between 1959 and 1989, food security was achieved in Cuba through the 
Revolution's commitment to social equity and robust agricultural yields using 
petroagriculture supported by the Soviet bloc. Once the Cuban oil supply was cut off, 
with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Cuba was no longer able to participate in the so­
called Green Revolution. Cuba lost access to oil imports traded for sugar exports, sugar 
production itself reliant on the imported oil as an input. And, Cuba lost basic foodstuffs 
imported in exchange for both oil-reliant sugar exports and re-exported oil. Food security 
was jeopardized. 
A major transformation in agriculture ensued. Food security was then achieved 
through the implementation of organic growing techniques, the local cultivation of 
multiple crops to support self-sufficiency, and the maintenance of provisions fr�m before 
the Soviet collapse that ensured all citizens have access to food and/or to necessary 
resources for food production (Altieri, et al. 1999; Altieri, Rosset, & Thrupp 1998; 
Companioni, et al. 2001; Crawford 2003; Enriquez 2000; Koont 2004; McKibben 2005; 
Murphy 1999; Nieto & Delgado 2001 ; Rosset 2000; Rosset & Benjamin 1994). 
Here I highlight how Cuba accomplished a transformation in the mode of 
agricultural production to achieve food security following the elimination of petroleum. 
By identifying some of the conditions that sparked and sustained urban agriculture in 
Cuba, lessons emerge for urban agriculture and food security elsewhere following the 
global peak in oil production. 
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The Dialectical Emergence and Development of Urban Agriculture 
Understanding the Cuban case hinges on uncovering how Cuba transformed the 
mode of agricultural production, from petroleum-reliant to organic and local, and retain 
the characteristic of being non-capitalist, so quickly and without advanced planning. I 
suggest that Cuba's success is largely the result of a dialectical process by which urban 
agriculture first emerged and then developed within Cuba. By dialectical process I mean 
a "process of constant transformation driven by the contradictions internal to and 
constitutive of successive social and political forms" (Callinicos 1999:78). It was, as 
Laura Enriquez (2000) argues, the underlying tension of the "limitations inherent in the 
model of agricultural development" employed by Revolutionary Cuba, exposed by the 
Soviet collapse, that stimulated a change in agricultural production (p. 1 ). 
Food security was originally achieved in Cuba through the use of Soviet­
supported Green Revolution prescriptions - monocrop production for export and the use 
of earned revenue to import foodstuffs - and the equitable distribution of food that was 
thus plentiful. This equitable distribution was achieved via various techniques discussed 
previously, namely a rationing system that provided basic foodstuffs to citizens, the 
maintenance of affordable food, the provision of meals at work and schools, and the grey 
and black markets. A notable achievement, food security was attainable because food 
was not completely commodified. The non-capitalist state of Cuba prized equality over 
ever-growing capital accumulation. 
However, a contradiction emerged when the petroleum-dependency of Cuban 
agriculture was exposed with the loss of Soviet bloc trade relations and the tightening of 
restrictions imposed by the United States. The food security enjoyed in Cuba prior to 
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1989 depended entire�y (and unsustainably) on petroleum. Cuba was no longer able to 
rely on external trade to maintain its long-standing dedication to f?od security. The 
availability of imported foodstuffs was drastically cut by the loss of oil imported in 
exchange for sugar exports. Both petroleum-dependent sugar exports and the re-export 
of oil generated revenue for the import of basic foodstuffs . 
. Without oil, agricultural production levels decreased immediately. The 
government-initiated Special Period in Peacetime was an austerity program aimed at 
reorganizing the entire social structure of the country to adapt to the changing conditions. 
Cuba's achievement of food security between 1959 and 1989 was both a badge of pride 
and a foundation of its legitimacy, and because of this, when the Special Period began, 
Cuba remained dedicated to preserving that security (Altieri, et al. 1999; Nieto & 
Delgado 2002; Perez 2002). 
Organic agriculture was widely implemented after the collapse of the Soviet bloc 
as a necessity. Synthetic inputs were simply no longer available to Cuba. The country 
was forced to look inward and devise solutions with the resources available locally. 
Koont (2004) explains: "Cuba has become a gigantic laboratory for farming without 
petroleum and petroleum derivatives" (p. 15). This conversion was enabled by the 
extensive scientific knowledge developed in Cuba throughout the second half of the 20th 
century. 
Cuba had developed national technological capabilities for 30 years, since the 
onset of the Revolution. The vast population of scientists and the extraordinary array of 
research were well suited for employing organic techniques during the Special Period. In 
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this respect, Cuba was well prepared for the end of cheap, abundant oil. The role of 
education in transforming Cuban agriculture, McKibben (2005) posits: 
turns out to be important, because farming, especially organic farming, 
especially when you're not used to doing it, is no simple task. You don't 
just tear down the fence around the vacant lot and hand someone a hoe, 
quoting him some Maoist couplet about the inevitable victory of the 
worker. The soil's no good at first, the bugs can't wait to attack. You 
need information to make a go of it. To a very large extent, the rise of 
Cuba's semi-organic agriculture is almost as much an invention of science 
and technology as the high-input tractor farming it replaced, which is 
another thing that makes this story so odd (p. 64 ). 
However, a contradiction emerged in that the conditions that spurred the Cuban 
government to initiate the Special Period also limited the abilities of the government to 
achieve food security across the nation. The Cuban government was unable to provide 
direct hunger relief fast enough. Food shortages, particularly within urban areas, 
remained a troublesome feature of Cuban life. The continued lack of food security 
during the early stages of the Special Period gave rise to urban agriculture. 
Early in the crisis, urban agriculture first emerged as a popular movement; people 
needed food fast, so they grew it. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and subsequent U.S. 
reaction to push Cuba deeper into crisis limited the ability of the Cuban government to 
respond to the crisis. Thus, the policy prescriptions of the Special Period were 
insufficient to provide immediate relief to urban areas. The acute grievances of urban 
food shortages in Cuba during the early years of the Special Period mobilized urbanites to 
take action. Food production within urban areas expanded rapidly. In fact, Murphy 
(1999) posits: 
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With the onset of the crisis, urban gardens sprang up all over Havana, a 
massive popular response by the residents themselves to the food 
shortages . . .  In the abrupt absence of food previously guaranteed by the 
government at very low prices, thousands of urban dwellers began to 
cultivate it for themselves (p. 12). 
As many analysts have demonstrated, urban agriculture emerged first and 
foremost as a popular movement (Altieri 2002; Altieri, et al. 1999; Companioni, et al. 
2002; Crawford 2003; Funes 2002; Gonzalez 2003; Koont 2004; Murphy 1999; Rosset 
2000; Rosset & Bourque 2002). In the early days urban agriculture was not a coordinated 
response. The production of food occupied any and all available space within urban 
centers; from balconies to schoolyards, roadsides to factory lots, gardens sprang up 
almost overnight (Altieri 2002; Altieri, et al. 1999; Companioni, et al. 2002; Crawford 
2003; Funes 2002; Gonzalez 2003; Koont 2004; Murphy 1999; Rosset 2000; Rosset & 
Bourque 2002). 
At the time of the Soviet collapse in 1989, Cuban policy actually prohibited food 
production in front of urban residences. Murphy ( 1999) explains, "all food crops were 
relegated to the back or side yards, kept out of sight" (p. 12). Cuban policy supported the 
separation between town and country, particularly in terms of food production, as an 
inherited feature from colonial rule. 
The Cuban government responded to the burgeoning urban agriculture movement 
by officially including urban agriculture into the Special Period. Murphy (1999) notes, 
"The Ministry of Agriculture and Havana's city government responded to the enthusiasm 
of Havana's residents by providing needed services and facilitating the expansion of the 
movement. This greatly accelerated the popular movement already underway" (p. 12). 
While the exact characteristics of the public movement and pressure for state support for 
urban agriculture is a question best left for additional research, we know that the Cuban 
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government supported the urban movement, for example, by formally establishing the ' 
Urban Agriculture Department in 1994 - chronologically later than the appearance of 
urban agriculture. 
State support complemented the popular origins of the urban agriculture 
movement. The overall success of urban agriculture is based on the collective efforts of 
both government bodies and local grassroots initiatives. The grassroots emergence of 
urban agriculture was aided by government actions, particularly the guarantee of access 
to the most fundamental necessity for food production - land (Koont 2004; Nieto & 
Delgado 2002). 
The dedication of Cuba to food security prior to the forced end of petroagriculture 
paved the way for food security post-petroagriculture. The Cuban state remained 
committed to food security after the Soviet collapse, and thus supported the popular 
initiatives under new and challenging circumstances. The government, not directed 
toward facilitating capital accumulation, could support the urban agriculture movement. 
Cuba had subscribed to the Green Revolution and used petroagriculture as a means to 
achieve food security, not as an end-goal to generate profit. Although Cuban agriculture 
before the Special Period used a lot of the same tools, inputs, and techniques as capitalist 
agriculture, this in and of itself did not make Cuban agriculture during this time capitalist 
in any sense. The Cuban commitment to the Revolution and food security after 1989, 
however, is as much a result of unique historic, national, and political forces as it is the 
result of socio-economic conditions (Perez 2002). 
The question arises: why did Cuba remain committed to the socialist project and 
not follow the same path as other former members of the Soviet bloc or former states of 
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the Soviet Union toward neo-liberal capitalism? It is precisely the nationalism and 
commitment to self-determination of Cuba that shaped development following the Soviet 
collapse; In Eastern Europe similarly strong nationalist traditions characterize the region. 
Countries in Eastern Europe, however, rejected socialism in the wake of the Soviet 
collapse. This trajectory of this development is in many ways a response similar to that 
of Cuba. · In the case of Eastern Europe, socialism was largely imposed from without. 
The rejection of socialism was thus as much an affirmation of self-determination as 
rooted in socio-economic structures. For Cuba, the continued dedication to socialism 
served as a means to assert self-determination and to insulate itself from U.S. influence 
and/or outright control (Perez 2002). 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc, coupled with increased U.S. aggression, could 
have just as easily undermined Cuba's commitment to food security. Instead, these 
developments actually affirmed Cuban dedication to self-determination. The U.S. 
pressure limited the options of Cuban development. The dire conditions in Cuba coupled 
with the U.S. stance pushed the appeal to defend the Cuban nation against imperialist 
aggression. The worse the conditions in Cuba turned and the more the U.S. pushed, the 
more Cuba resisted. U.S. policy toward Cuba is aimed toward bringing Cuba to its knees 
by making material conditions for Cubans too difficult to survive. Perez (2002) explains, 
"The intent was to politicise hunger as a means of promoting popular disaffection, in the 
hope that driven by want and motivated by despair Cubans would rise up and oust Fidel 
Castro" (p. 241, emphasis added). 
The contradiction, however, of immigration policy that allows Cubans to remain 
in the U.S. once inside U.S. territory serves as a pressure valve in many respects; the 
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external pressure on Cuba from the U.S. does not reach point of internal conflict as long 
as Cubans can emigrate to the U.S. Perez (2002) explains: 
The concept of sanctions, from the early 1 960s up to the 1 990s, was 
deeply flawed. The pressures created by four decades of sanctions - and 
these pressures were at times real and substantial - were in large part 
relieved by Cuban emigration. Even as the United States tightened 
economic pressures on Cuba, it also and at the same time loosened 
immigration restrictions for Cubans, thereby providing· relief from the very 
distress it succeeded in creating" (p. 249). 
If U.S. policy was reflective and not just reactionary, the pressure on Cuba would be 
redirected to build opposition to the Cuban government and the nation might very well 
develop in accordance to U.S. desires. Instead, the U.S. holds steadfast to contradictory 
policy that encourages enduring Cuban resolve (Perez 2002). However, ongoing U.S. 
pressure remains as a constant challenge to Cuba's successful alternative to 
petroagriculture. 
Continued Challenges to Urban Agriculture 
Some challenges remain to the long-term sustainability of urban agriculture in 
Cuba. The problems faced by Cuba are not unique. Urban agriculture anywhere, 
particularly if practiced on a large scale, faces similar limitations and concerns (Altieri, et 
al. 1999; Crawford 20003; Murphy 1999). 
Ecological constraints, such as water shortages, lack of adequate soil for 
production, and pests and diseases, are the most pressing challenges to urban organic 
agriculture. Water shortages are particularly problematic for urban agriculture in Cuba, 
as water has always been a major concern for Cuban municipalities. Trepidation over 
land availability and the adequacy of soil to maintain crops fall close behind water as a 
60 
major worry for urban food production in Cuba (and elsewhere) (Altieri, et al. 1999; 
Crawford 2003; Murphy 1999). These ecological limitations, however, did not impede 
the Cuban transition, indicating that they·can be managed. 
Urban air and water pollution, along with contaminated soil, pose great problems 
to urban food production. Lead, in particular, is a dangerous contaminant in Cuba and 
elsewhere in the global South. Many types of produce, especially green, leafy 
vegetables, easily transport such heavy metals. The problem of urban pollution is a great 
threat to urban agriculture. Crawford (2003) explains the dangers, "At the very least, 
such contamination threatens any designation of locally grown food in urban areas as 
'organic.' ·  At the most, it threatens the integrity of a healthy food supply" (p. 753). 
Urban agriculture is also continually undermined by popular perceptions. This 
challenge faced by urban agriculture, Crawford (2003) notes, "is the need to convince 
citizenry that the practice is both desirable and viable. This appears to be true even in 
developing countries, like Cuba, that face serious food self-sufficiency challenges" (p. 
75 1). Urban food production is often viewed in Cuba as a sign of poverty or serves to 
evoke the repression of slavery and colonialism in Cuban history. Colonizers historically 
viewed urban agriculture as "primitive" and such practices were thus shunned. Food 
production in former colonies tends to remain modeled on the colonial power; in the case 
of Cuba, the town-country divisions characteristic of Cuba today were established by 
Spain during early colonization. The negative perspective of urban food production 
remains as a historical legacy of colonialism (Crawford 2003). 
The success of urban agriculture, however, is beginning to change popular 
perceptions in Cuba. Beyond perceptions, remaining obstacles within the population at-
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large are the scarcity of workers educated and experienced in diversified agricultural 
production . . Crawford (2003) observes that "the difficulty in making urban agriculture 
permanent in Cuba is more than merely making it seem worthwhile; it is a matter of 
educating the population as· to the variety- of opportunities urban agriculture can offer" (p. 
752). Thus far, the government's urban agricultural initiatives have struggled against this 
challenge and both popular perceptions and public knowledge regarding urban agriculture 
is moving steadily forward. 
Finally, coordination and planning between farmers, state officials, and other key 
players in the urban agriculture endeavor remain somewhat problematic. Although 
planners now recognize the importance of urban food production, land-use planning 
impedes the development of urban farming as agriculture is often excluded from urban 
designs� Often, local officials stand at odds with centralized state oversight. 
Coordination between stakeholders then becomes a troublesome feature (Altieri, et al. 
1999; Crawford 2003). 
Coordination problems between farmers and key government officials are 
specifically socio-ecological, rather than environmental and/or technical in nature. 
However, it is precisely the manner in which socio-ecological challenges of an urban 
agriculture system are handled that determines the manageability of other obstacles. The 
compatibilities and tensions between what central planners and local experts can or want 
to do with ecological limitations and various environmental and technical inputs into 
urban agriculture influence the degree to which urban agriculture succeeds or fails. 
In Cuba, the same dialectical process from which urban agriculture emerged, 
. developed, and ultimately succeeded has mitigated the coordination problems; that 
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dialectical process fostered collaboration between the Cuban state and Cubans. Despite 
the ideological commitment of the state to food security, the Soviet collapse created 
conditions that the state, no longer knowledgeable and/or able to fulfill the needs of 
Cubans, was receptive to popular pressure for food security. That Cuba was not a 
capitalist state sh_aped debates regarding agriculture to ensure that the needs of Cubans 
are central to decision making processes. Richard Levins (2002) explains: 
Decisions about pesticides, about specialization, about livestock 
technology and mechanization followed prolonged debate which is still 
taking place. In Cuba, as in the United States, the debate can be 
frustrating. We can find stubbornness, conservatism, ignorance, and even 
stupidity in any country. But what is different is that in Cuba the debates 
were expressions only of differences of opinions and therefore reason can 
eventually prevail. In capitalist countries, debates about technology are 
often weapons in the conflict of interests. The makers of pesticides never 
ask what might be the best way of reducing pest damage while protecting 
soil and people, but ·rather, what is the best way to turn oil into marketable 
commodities to sell to farmers, and they defend their products with a . 
ferocity driven by the bottom line (p. 279). 
As difficult as the challenges to urban agriculture in Cuba may be, the country 
and its citizens press on to maintain food security for all as a basic human right. Cuba 
was compelled by political and economic forces to reorganize agriculture to become 
organic and local. The global peak in oil production may provide a similar catalyst for · 
change in agriculture elsewhere. 
Lessons from the Cuban Experience in Transforming Agriculture 
Cuba is a unique case. The Special Period in particular was distinct to Cuba. But, 
as McKibben (2005) notes, "There's always at least the possibility . . .  that larger sections 
of the world might be in for 'Special Periods' of their own" (p. 62). I suggest that the 
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global peak in oil production will serve as a catalyst for ushering in a sort of global 
Special Period. Agriculture reliant on petroleum will face the same imperatives as were 
faced in Cuba. Thus, important lessons for an alternative agriculture may be learned 
from the Cuban example. In particular, urban agriculture can become a planned part of 
the inevitable transformation in the mode of agricultural production when peak oil is 
reached, to minimize disastrous food insecurity that would accompany an unplanned 
transition. Cuba suggests the potential of urban agriculture in facilitating food security 
after the global peak in oil production. 
The changes necessary to avoid expanding hunger after the global peak in oil 
production are necessarily organic, provide local self-sufficiency, and are non-capitalist. 
Urban agriculture is a means of food production that does not rely on oil and is founded 
upon all three criteria. 
Cuba was prepared for the end of petroagriculture, through the development of 
national capabilities between 1959 and 1989. This preparation is concrete, in terms of 
actual development of the Cuban infrastructure necessary for the shift, and in the broader 
sense of Cuban history, upon which the achievement of food security was possible in the 
first place. As these circumstances are quite unique to Cuba, countries wishing to follow 
Cuba's lead must plan for the transition in agricultural production. Cuba was well 
prepared to adapt to the unforeseen event of the Soviet collapse because the population 
was well educated, the Cuban state enjoyed legitimacy unparalleled in the state socialist 
world, and because the state was willing and able to support popular initiatives to ensure 
survival of the Revolution. These conditions do not apply to other societies. Thus the 
early warnings of the global peak in oil production should be heeded - it would be best to 
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plan the transition to � post-petroagriculture production. An unplanned transformation of 
agriculture will exacerbate the current trends of food insecurity, as production levels will 
drop without vast petroleum inputs. 
Cuba was not only prepared for the end of petroagriculture, but was also able to 
reorganize social systems to achieve food security and meet the criteria of being organic 
and local more easily than most other nations because it was already non-capitalist. Even 
under socialism, Cuba's agricultural system prior to the Special Period used the same 
productive forces as those used by capitalist agriculture. However, it was not capitalist 
precisely because production was not geared toward accumulation - where growing food 
is just an incidental step toward selling the food for profit and then reinvesting that profit 
in further and ideally larger-scale production - but toward food security. 
A first step toward realizing food security is the end of commodified agriculture. 
Although it appears unlikely (at this point in history) that a socialist revolution will sweep 
the globe, food may - and, I maintain, must - be removed from the capitalist market. 
Similar to calls for nationalized healthcare, the basic right of all humans to adequate food 
could conceivably be incorporated into the capitalist system. In fact, food security might 
very well be adopted as a long-term survival tactic of the capitalist system, as a way to 
simply reduce discontent in a manner similar to the social security policies of the 1930s 
in the United States. However, this step toward food security would not facilitate the 
transition away from petroagriculture in and of itself. Pesticides and herbicides, 
genetically modified organisms, and the transport and distribution systems could, and 
would, remain reliant on petroleum if subsequent steps are not taken. 
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This project may have raised more questions than it answered. My findings are 
preliminary, but draw some important conclusions regarding urban agriculture and · 
indicate the need for further study. 
The exact factors facilitating the emergence and nature of the popular movement 
for urban agriculture and the eventual success of the movement are difficult to grasp 
through secondary analysis. Additional primary research aimed at uncovering the 
specific characteristics of urban food production and the movement that spawned it, 
would be useful for grasping more fine-grained lessons from the Cuban experience. 
Further research is also needed to better assess the continued challenges to urban 
agriculture in Cuba. The options that will best facilitate longevity need to be uncovered 
to assist the continued development of urban food production. Finally, comparative 
research examining urban agriculture elsewhere will provide useful insights for the 
successful adoption of urban agriculture as an alternative to petroagriculture under 
different ecological, economic, geographic, historical, and political circumstances. 
Cuba demonstrates that there are no easy solutions for the complex problems of 
food security. However, there are basic tools that emerge as useful to transition 
agricultural production toward food security today and away from petroleum dependence 
tomorrow. Cuba demonstrates that today's popular protest call rings true - another world 
is indeed possible. 
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VI. Postscript 
I have no misgivings - this project did not adequately grasp the intricacy of 
Cuban agriculture and food security after 1989. The history of Cuba and Cubans greatly 
influenced the ability to achieve self-sufficiency during the Special Period. In-depth 
understanding of the factors involved in that success is not easily captured by a limited 
project such as this. Additionally, the role of oil in the contemporary "globalized".world 
is extremely complex, and thus difficult to adequately analyze as well. As I write, current 
events unfold hourly and oil plays a large role in shaping the ever-changing world. In 
short, it is difficult to remain abreast of current issues within any given research agenda. 
As this research examines currently unfolding socio-ecological, geophysical, and geo­
political conditions, a postscript is necessary to incorporate some of the continually 
unfolding factors involved in this project. 
The Future of Cuba's Success 
This research aimed to examine food security in Cuba, a struggle that is still 
unfolding daily. The future of Cuba and of the Revolution is entirely uncertain. Many 
issues impact the ability of Cuba to realize the goal of food security. The situation faced 
by Cubans is ever changing. Endless U.S. aggression and the growing potential of 
increasing U.S. violence toward the nation threaten Cuba on a continual basis. 
In another scenario, the long-standing call for the U.S. to end its barbaric embargo 
against Cuba would likely have drastic ramifications for Cuban food security. The influx 
of cheap agricultural commodities from the U.S. could completely undermine Cuba's 
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agricultural sector and plunge the island deeper into economic crisis. Despite Cuba's 
relative isolation within the capitalist world system and the impoverished state of the 
nation, food security is fully realized within Cuba, a feat no other country in the same 
economic situation has achieved. If, and when, the U.S. embargo ends - an action all 
supporters of social justice demand - Cuban development will enter uncharted territory 
and Cubans will face unknown consequences. 
As close as global peak oil production is, the certain passing of Fidel Castro, the 
leader of the Revolution since its victory, appears much closer. The path of a post-Castro 
Cuba is uncertain, particularly in terms of the social services available to Cubans and the 
continuation of the Revolution. The U.S. will most certainly interfere with the 
development of a post-Castro Cuba. 
Finally, there is the question of the emerging ties between Cuba and Venezuela 
(McKibben 2005). In late April 2005, Cuba began receiving 90,000 barrels of oil from 
Venezuela daily, up from the 53,000 barrels of oil provided on favorable terms of trade in 
2000 (Associated Press 2005). There is always the possibility that the new source of oil 
provided to Cuba and the developing relationship with Venezuela might spur the return to 
petroagriculture, thus undermining the success of urban agriculture. 
Moreover, the rapidly expanding relationship between Venezuela and Cuba draws 
attention to one thing I did not consider within this project: the extent to which 
petroleum-exporting countries like Venezuela will not need to change patterns of 
development and food systems as they could use monopoly rents generated from 
petroleum reserves to import agricultural commodities and/or continue petroagriculture. 
The Venezuela relationship could conceivably mark this emerging possibility. 
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It is too soon to say with certainty, but possibilities exist that burgeoning 
relationships with Venezuela might actually be an example of � successful planned 
transition away. from petroleum dependence. In the first place, peak oil represents that 
point at which half of all petroleum reserves are exhausted. A successful transition from 
petroagriculture will need to begin prior to the complete end of oil. Following the global 
peak of oil, existing reserves may be reallocated to areas of agriculture that necessitate oil 
use, such as rice production in Cuba. The trade relationship forged between Cuba and 
Venezuela are on more equal terms, politically speaking, and with greater ability to 
negotiate than the former ties with the Soviet bloc. Cuba is not producing one crop for 
export to Venezuela on favorable terms for oil and other necessary imports. Instead, 
Cuba has sent tens of thousands of doctors and educators to Venezuela, and has helped to 
develop the same intellectual infrastructure as enjoyed in Cuba. Along with doctors and 
teachers, there is also an emerging export of urban agriculture from Cuba to Venezuela, 
and food production is now found in Caracas. 
In the end, there remain countless reasons to remain optimistic that alternative 
agriculture and food security are mainstays in Cuba. The educated youth committed to 
self-sufficiency in food production, the resolve of Cubans, the success of alternative 
agriculture in Cuba, and the imminent peak in global oil production should ensure 
longevity of alternative agriculture in Cuba. Cubans have demonstrated time and again 
that they can survive, and even thrive, under the most adverse of conditions. 
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Petroleum's Endless Volatility 
. Oil remains at the forefront of the global consciousness. Soaring petroleum prices 
and ongoing U.S. milit� action that is directed toward strategic control of known 
petroleum reserves serve as daily reminders of the role oil plays in contemporary society. 
With petroleum priced well over $50 per barrel and rising daily, the direct effects of 
costly petroleum are being felt worldwide. Oil hit a record price on June 26, 2005, 
exceeding $60 a barrel for the first time in its history of trade on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (Reuters 2005b ). 
The global mar�et price of crude oil is not directly tied to supply, but it does 
indicate the importance of oil for the global economy and hints at the consequences of 
rising oil costs that will accompany the peak in global production. One indication of the 
effects of high oil costs is evident in the Labor Department's consumer price index where 
most prices have remained constant over the past year, with the exception of food and 
energy costs, which are the only reported indicators that continue to rise rapidly (Reuters 
2005a). 
Another sign of oil's near future is China's recent offer of $18.5 billion for 
Unocal, which touched off a bidding war for the U.S. oil company (Kahn 2005). Many 
analysts view China, the world's fastest growing economy, as a threat to the future of 
_ U.S. economic dominance. The Chinese bid for Unocal signals the growing importance 
of direct control over energy sources, particularly petroleum, as the global peak in 
production nears. 
Most alarming, the Exxon Mobil Corporation itself recently predicted a peak in 
non-OPEC oil production in just five years. The global peak in production, according to 
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Exxon Mobil, will occur soon thereafter, most likely within another ten years as a direct 
result of the increasing demand expected of OPEC to produce more oil. The entrance of 
Exxon Mobil into discussions of a global peak in oil is the first of any major oil company 
and serves as the most alarming signal of petroleum's future to date (Cavallo 2005). 
The transition away from petroleum dependence is a geophysical necessity; the 
sooner that transition begins, the more likely negative consequences can be averted -
particularly for the future of food production. Increasing recognition that the global peak 
in oil production is close at hand, coupled with i�creasing demand for crude and the 
escalating conflict over global petroleum resources, signals the need for society to divest 
its appetite for oil immediately. 
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